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1 
YOU SPEAK AN “INFINITE DEAL OF 
NOTHING”*: PRIORITIZING FREE SPEECH 
OVER OTHER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
JACQUELINE AHEARN† 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Imagine that you are a young woman, alone on the sidewalk 
walking toward a Planned Parenthood or similar clinic.  Although 
there are any number of reasons from breast cancer to STD testing 
to go to such a clinic, you are there for an abortion.  Hopefully, you 
have a support group of friends, family, or loved ones, but it is 
entirely possible you do not.  And as you approach the clinic doors, 
a crowd of protestors you have been eyeing apprehensively grows 
louder and closer, jeering and gesturing.  
When you get close enough to hear their words, you realize they 
are screaming at you about your baby, the fetus growing inside 
you.  It is entirely likely that the facts they are shouting are 
incorrect, but it is also likely that you do not know enough to know 
that.  You probably never thought you would be here, now, 
wondering if it was true that the fetus you carried had eyelashes 
after just 4 weeks, like the sign you just passed says.1  
Once your destination is clear, they crowd you.  They never 
touch you, never even block your path, but you stop because even 
though you could squeeze between the young man holding 
pamphlets and the elderly woman brandishing a sign, you feel 
 
*WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE COMPLETE PELICAN SHAEKSPEARE 294. “The Merchant of 
Venice”, Act I, Scene I, line 115. 
†Candidate for J.D. 2016, St. John’s School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, Political Science 
and English, University of South Carolina, May 2013. 
1 RICHARD E. JONES & KRISTIN H. LOPEZ, HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE BIOLOGY 273 (3d ed. 
2006) (stating the fetus develops eyelashes around 24 weeks. A generous person may 
attribute the incorrect sign to a typo, though anti-choice protestors do sometimes use 
intentionally misleading or false information). 
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trapped.  They want you to feel trapped.  They want to engage you, 
persuade you, convince you, and all too often, threaten you. And 
maybe you try to engage them, answering their shouts and jeers.  
Many women do, clearing their throats and raising their voices, 
justifying their choice or correcting the misinformation.  But most 
women simply stand there, confused, shaking, or distraught.  With 
papers and pamphlets flying in your face, shouting all around you, 
and a feeling of the protestors circling, closing in on you like you 
sit at the center of baited water, you may not know what to say, 
how to say it, how to make yourself heard, or how to extricate 
yourself from the situation.  The clinic escort (if you have been 
lucky enough to choose a clinic that has escorts) will take this 
moment to touch your arm gently, and guide you away. 
“There is no reasoning with them,” the escort will mutter 
soothingly in your ear, if you look upset.  “I’ve tried.  Just 
remember you don’t owe them anything.  You know what is right 
for you.”  That short speech will carry you to the doors of the clinic; 
hopefully you will not hear the crowd follow you to the doors, 
screaming all the way. 
Depending on where you live and what the laws of your state 
are like, you may have the procedure done that day, or you may 
have simply had a consultation.  Like any medical procedure, the 
information is a little overwhelming, although the kind doctor 
tried to explain it to you. The information has filled your head and 
you have completely forgotten the protestors, until you look out 
the glass door as you exit and feel a sinking feeling in your 
stomach.  It is all you can do to open the door and step outside. 
If you have had the procedure already, you are weakened and 
tired, on a small dose of painkillers and in no position to deal with 
the screaming.  Rest is generally prescribed for women2 who have 
just had an abortion, but you will find none outside the clinic doors. 
Imagine that you are this woman, leaving after a minor surgical 
procedure, alone, facing or having just faced an often-difficult 
 
2 See FAQ: Post-Abortion Care and Recovery, University of California San Francisco, 
http://www.ucsfhealth.org/education/post-abortion_care_and_recovery/ (last visited Mar. 7, 
2015); see also Common Questions Women Have After an Abortion, FAMILY PLANNING 
SPECIALISTS MEDICAL GROUP, http://familyplanningspecialists.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Common-Questions-Women-Have-After-An-Abortion.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
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decision fraught with personal turmoil or at least with social 
stigma. 
Now imagine that these people, who have harassed, belittled, 
and frightened you once already, stop you again.  This time you 
push past.  And then a frail old woman grabs your arm, pulls you 
back, looks you in the eye and says, “you’re going to die.”3 
It is hard to say where the threat begins and proselytizing, 
“sidewalk counseling,” or protesting ends, or even whether 
interactions like the above constitute a threat.  In many states 
women are not protected from this kind of verbal abuse.  Scenes 
like these are common to clinics during protests, and it certainly 
feels like a threat to many women who are already facing difficult, 
trying, or isolating circumstances. 
Massachusetts had a law in place to protect clinic patients from 
such situations, the Massachusetts Reproductive Healthcare 
Facilities Act (MRHFA),4 which created a buffer zone around 
abortion clinics.  A buffer zone creates a space around a given 
location, such as a clinic building, where protestors or people who 
do not have legitimate business in the location cannot enter.  
Buffer zones take many forms, but most commonly protect 
entrances and driveways.  The Massachusetts buffer zone was 
reviewed in the 2014 decision McCullen v. Coakley,5 and the 
Supreme Court struck down the MRHFA as a violation of the free 
speech rights of the protestors who brought the suit. 
One of the most basic tenets of our country is the entitlement to 
free speech.6 The government may not make illegal or curtail most 
forms of speech, even if it is distasteful or upsetting.  Nevertheless, 
to pursue genuine and compelling state interests, some 
restrictions on free speech are allowed.  The law restricting speech 
 
3 It is hard to know what this utterance means, especially when frightened and alone. 
Context clues may provide an answer: if her pamphlet warns of the risks of abortion, she 
may be trying to over-emphasize the risks and scare you; religious signs may mean she 
speaks metaphorically of your soul or of god’s wrath; if she is surrounded by younger, 
stronger protestors she may even want to goad you into a fight. You may simply be unable 
to tell, but you will almost certainly feel guilt, shame, fear, anxiety, or some combination of 
all of these. 
4 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 266 §120E1/2. 
5 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014). 
6 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. 
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must be content neutral7 and narrowly tailored.8 Traditionally, 
buffer zones around various public spaces have been upheld as 
constitutional speech restrictions.9 
However, the Court in McCullen v. Coakley overturned the 
MRHFA, ruling it was an unconstitutional restriction on free 
speech.  Although the context of abortion and clinic violence is 
surprisingly under-discussed in the decision, given the changing 
attitudes toward abortion and the increased passivity toward 
protecting abortion as a right, the decision is not entirely 
surprising.  The Court has backed away from protecting abortion 
rights and has enabled and allowed more restrictions as time 
passed, and this decision is just another chip in the foundations of 
the Court’s Roe v. Wade decision, and just another example of 
increasing hostility toward abortion.  What is surprising about the 
case is its departure from free speech precedent, as the Court has 
prioritized free speech over state concerns in a way that conflicts 
with other free speech decisions.  This Comment will assert that 
the Court has likely caused a future increase in violence against 
women and other people who utilize, work for, or support abortion 
clinics, weakened the fundamental right to abortion, and 
prioritized free speech over equally important rights and interests.  
Part II will provide background on abortion and demonstrate the 
change in attitudes toward and increasing restrictions of abortion.  
Part III will discuss the history of buffer zones and McCullen and 
will look at how McCullen departs from free speech precedent.  It 
will argue that the Court has incorrectly prioritized free speech as 
a result of a hostility and bias toward abortion rights.  This 
Comment will conclude that the Court has wrongly decided 
McCullen and will need to revisit the decision at a later date.  It 
will assert that the Supreme Court has wrongly prioritized free 
 
7 Meaning that it cannot restrict certain kinds of speech. All speech must be restricted 
equally. For a pertinent example, a state may not restrict anti-abortion speech around an 
abortion clinic. However, it may restrict all speech around a clinic, if the law is narrowly 
tailored and serves a legitimate state interest. 
8 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (holding that an ordinance 
imposing a noise buffer on a concert was not a violation of free speech, since it was not an 
overly broad restriction). 
9 See generally Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 802 (holding that a noise buffer zone 
around a charity concert was constitutional); Phillips v. Borough of Keyport, 107 F.3d. 164 
(1997) (holding that a buffer zone around an adult entertainment store was constitutional); 
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1991) (upholding a buffer zone prohibiting soliciting votes 
around a polling location). 
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speech in an attempt to facilitate the chipping away of abortion 
rights, and that the decision is not in line with precedent. 
 
II. Abortion Restrictions Increase, Standards of Scrutiny 
in Restricting Abortion Become Less Strict 
 
McCullen is a complicated case, and the decision addresses the 
complex interplay that occurs when two rights seem to clash.  
Here, these rights are the right to privacy (and by extension, an 
abortion) and the right to freedom of speech.  It is important to 
understand the history of abortion law in the country and how it 
has evolved to signal an era of hostility toward abortion rights and 
a Court unwilling to vigorously protect such rights. 
A. Background on Abortion 
The history of abortion extends to the beginning of mankind,10 
but the history of legal abortion in America is fairly recent.  One 
in three women in the United States will have an abortion by the 
age of forty-five.11 Abortion was legal until 1821,12 when it was 
banned in Connecticut after quickening, with other states 
following shortly thereafter.13 Between 1821 and 1973, only four 
states allowed abortion upon request, although some allowed 
abortion in cases of rape or danger to the life of the mother.14 In 
fact, until 1965, states could also legally prohibit men and women 
from obtaining and using birth control.15 
 
10 See Numbers 5:24, KING JAMES BIBLE (referencing abortion within the Bible); see 
also JAMES M. RIDDLE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION FROM THE ANCIENT WORLD TO THE 
RENAISSANCE 27-28 (1994) (explaining that the Greek city-state of Cyrene drove a 
subspecies of giant fennel, called silphium, extinct because its abortifacient properties were 
so high in demand). 
11 See Planned Parenthood, Health Info: Abortion, 
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-info/abortion (last visited Mar. 6, 2014). 
12 N.E.H. Hull & Peter Charles Hoffer, ROE V. WADE: THE ABORTION RIGHTS 
CONTROVERSY IN AMERICAN HISTORY 20 (2001). 
13 Id. Quickening is the point at fetal development where the mother can feel the fetus 
move. 
14 See generally PEW RESEARCH CENTER, A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S. 
Supreme Court (2013), available at http://www.pewforum.org/2013/01/16/a-history-of-key-
abortion-rulings-of-the-us-supreme-court/#regulations. These states were New York, 
Hawaii, Alaska, and Washington. 
15 See Anthony Comstock’s “Chastity” Laws, PBS, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/peopleevents/e_comstock.html (last visited Mar. 3, 
2015); see also SANA LOUE ET AL., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WOMEN’S HEALTH, Comstock Laws 183-
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 In 1965, the Supreme Court decided Griswold v. Connecticut,16 
and found there was a constitutional right of marital privacy17, 
which was violated when married couples were prevented from 
accessing birth control.18 This privacy right was extended to single 
people in the 1972 decision Eisenstadt v. Baird,19 where the court 
ruled that privacy rights are inherent in the individual,20 
especially in something “so fundamentally affecting a person as 
the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”21 These two cases 
set the foundation on which a landmark case would be decided only 
one year after Baird.  The case22 was Roe v. Wade23, and it 
extended this individual right to private determinations about 
childbearing to its logical conclusion.  It overturned a complete ban 
on abortion and made abortion legal throughout the country.24  
The court ruled, as Griswold and Baird did before it, that the 
right to privacy was encompassed in the penumbra of unspoken 
rights granted by the language of the Constitution25, and that this 
privacy right included the right to make sexual and reproductive 
decisions.26 Though the right to abortion is based in a fundamental 
privacy right, there is no right to privacy explicitly laid out in the 
 
84 (2004). On March 3, 1873, Congress passed the Comstock Act. This law specifically 
designated contraception as obscene material and made it a federal crime to disseminate 
birth control through the mail or across state lines. Many states soon followed suit and 
passed their own Comstock Laws, prohibiting the use, prescription, or dissemination of 
birth control. Though key elements of the Comstock Law were repealed in 1971, some 
vestiges remain, which have not been repealed despite several attempts. The latest attempt 
to repeal the vestiges of the law was in 1997. See H.R. 2272, 105th Cong. (1997). 
16 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
17 Id. at 485. 
18 See id. at 484. Though this constitutional right is not spelled out, the Court found 
that the Bill of Rights contains certain rights by implication, called the penumbra of rights. 
Griswold is based on the implied right to privacy created in the penumbra, which is 
implicated in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.  
19 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
20 Id. at 453. 
21 Id. 
22 Although technically the Roe decision was a joint decision on two cases, Roe v. Wade 
and Doe v. Bolton, it is often referred to as Roe for convenience. See, e.g., Lynne M. Kohm, 
Roe’s Effects on Family Law, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339, 1343 (2014) (referring to Roe v. 
Wade as Roe). 
23 410 U.S. 113 (1973), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 
(1992). 
24 See id. at 164. Though the law in question was a Texas law, the Supreme Court’s 
decision to find the law unconstitutional meant that all states with laws banning abortion 
became invalid.  
25 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
26 Id. 
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Constitution.27 Nonetheless, the Court found such a right to exist.  
It finds the roots of this right to privacy in the First Amendment,28 
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments,29 the penumbra of rights,30 the 
Ninth Amendment,31 and in the Fourteenth Amendment concept 
of liberty.32 Only personal rights that are deemed “‘fundamental’ 
or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’”33 can fall under this 
guarantee of privacy, and this privacy right is broad enough to 
encompass abortion.34 
Roe determined that a state needed to have a compelling state 
interest to restrict access to abortion.35 This is the most stringent 
standard of review for any restrictions placed on a right, and is 
called strict scrutiny review.36 In fact, Roe was decided with 
“particularly careful scrutiny,”37 an even more heightened and 
careful evaluation of abortion restrictions.38 It was understood 
from the decision that abortion, as a fundamental right 
encompassed in privacy rights, was to be reviewed under at least 
strict scrutiny, and that the Court should take extra care with it.  
Under this standard, most abortion restrictions would fail, 
particularly those affecting the first trimester.39 Roe ruled that in 
the first trimester, a patient and the consulting physician were 
free to determine “without regulation by the state” that a 
pregnancy should be terminated.40 The right to an abortion is 
 
27 Id (acknowledging this, the Court goes on to explain how and where it exists in the 
Constitution despite not being explicitly stated). 
28 Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). 
29 Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
350-51 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886)). 
30 The penumbra of rights are rights which, although not explicitly stated in the 
Constitution, follow logically from the rights that are explicitly granted. Therefore, these 
implicit rights are in the penumbra, or shadow, of the Constitution. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
31 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring)). 
32 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
33 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 155. 
36 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 504. 
37 Roe, 410 U.S. at 170. 
38 Id. at 156. 
39 Roe v. Wade ruled that an expecting person was to be less restricted in terminating 
a fetus pre-viability, and that the state interest in protecting the unborn fetus became 
greater as the fetus approached full term. 
40 Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. 
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fundamental, the Court said, and may be effectuated “free of 
interference by the State.”41 
Women were not long without interference by the State, and 
strict scrutiny did not remain the standard for long.  In 1992, 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey42 
changed the standard applied by the courts to determine if state 
abortion restrictions were too onerous.43 The Court changed the 
standard to an “undue burden,”44 which was a new standard.  The 
Court ruled that this was an “appropriate means of reconciling the 
State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally protected 
liberty.”45 In Casey, Pennsylvania required a 24-hour waiting 
period before an abortion, as well as spousal consent, parental 
consent for minors, and other restrictions.46  
All restrictions but the spousal consent passed the newly 
lowered standard of review.  Restrictions must now simply avoid 
placing an “undue burden”47 on people who seek abortions. Rather 
than requiring that the state have a compelling and legitimate 
interest in the regulation,48 under this standard the plaintiff—the 
person providing an abortion, seeking one, or otherwise 
challenging restrictions—must prove that the state regulation 
“has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”49 Not 
only does this have the effect of shifting the burden of proof to the 
challenger of the statute, but it is also a less rigorous standard of 
review, which has allowed more restrictions of abortion than 
would have been allowed if the Roe standard of strict scrutiny had 
continued.  This vague new standard posed problems for 
legislatures and courts trying to interpret the circumstances 
under which they may regulate abortion, and the decision also 
signaled an unwillingness on the part of the Court to stringently 
protect abortion rights, emboldening anti-choice legislators to 
 
41 Id. 
42 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
43 Id at 874. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 876. 
46 Id. at 881. 
47 Id. at 876. 
48 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992). 
49 Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. 
AHEARN, MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2017  2:22 PM 
2017 ABORTION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 9 
curtail the rights of people seeking abortions since the decision in 
1992. 
B. The Problems With Undue Burden 
One of the many problems with the Casey decision is that the 
articulated standard is vaguer than the previous standard.  Strict 
scrutiny is well defined, and it is also a relatively subjective 
standard.  The undue burden standard invites the judicial system 
to speculate on what is, and what is not, a substantial burden on 
women who often have very different socioeconomic backgrounds 
and lifestyles than the judges and justices of the court.  The 
Supreme Court has not issued a bright line rule for what an undue 
burden is, because there is no way to articulate a bright line rule.  
But until the Court acknowledges that a small subset of women 
bear a disproportionate amount of the burden in abortion 
regulation, they will never properly apply an undue burden 
analysis.  And the way that undue burden is applied makes it 
easier for the Court to take a lax stance on abortion protections. 
C. Changing Standards, Changing Attitudes towards 
Abortion 
Casey signaled the beginning of a shift in how the Court 
protected abortion rights, and in more legislative restrictions on 
abortion rights.  Since 1992, anti-abortion legislation has risen 
steadily,50 with 950 bills proposed in 2010 alone.51 Of those 950, 
89 passed, more than double what was passed in 2008.52 More 
anti-abortion legislation was passed in 2011-2013 than the entire 
decade previous.53 As of now, 89% of U.S. counties have no 
abortion clinic,54 and for women in those counties who must travel 
 
50 Heather D. Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, A Surge of State Abortion Restrictions Puts 
Providers—and the Women They Serve—in the Crosshairs, GUTTMACHER POLICY REVIEW, 
(Winter 2014), at 10, available at: 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/17/1/gpr170109.html#chart. 
51 Id. 
52 Guttmacher Inst., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2010 State Policy 
Review, GUTTMACHER INST., (2010), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2010/statetrends42010.html. 
53 Boonstra & Nash, supra note 50. 
54 State Facts About Abortion: Texas at 2, GUTTMACHER INST. (2014), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/sfaa/pdf/texas.pdf. 
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elsewhere to obtain their abortion, the distance can be almost 
unmanageably far.  Texas is frequently in the news for its extreme 
anti-abortion measures, and as the second largest state in the 
nation at 268,820 square miles, it has just 8 abortion clinics as of 
2014.55 Even assuming that each clinic was spread equidistant 
from the next,56 each clinic would need to serve an astonishing 
33,602.5 square miles.  For comparison, Massachusetts has 10,554 
total square-miles and 12 abortion clinics as of 2013.57 If each 
clinic were equidistant from the others,58 each clinic would serve 
only 879.5 square-miles. For a resident of Massachusetts, a 24-
hour waiting period may not be considered burdensome, given the 
relative proximity to a clinic.59 For a resident of Texas, however, a 
24-hour waiting period likely means that 48 hours in total are 
taken from work, school, or search for employment.  It means 
finding childcare, borrowing a car, finding money for bus fare or 
gas, and significant amounts of travel during a phase of pregnancy 
can be characterized as weariness and morning sickness for 
many.60 In Massachusetts, a consultation, even a procedure, may 
be close enough to achieve within a lunch break or a half-day.  In 
Texas, only a few lucky women have that convenience. 
For a young woman who is undergoing her abortion procedure 
due to rape, many restrictions can be cruel and even traumatic.  
 
55 Texas Abortion Clinic Map, FUND TEXAS CHOICE, 
http://fundtexaswomen.org/resources/texas-abortion-clinic-map/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2015). 
56 And this is not the case: the clinics are all located in or near a major city: Dallas (2), 
Fort Worth (1), Austin (1), San Antonio (2), or Houston (2). See id. 
57 Abortion Providers in Massachusetts, National Abortion Rights Action League 
Massachusetts (Jul. 2, 2013), available at, 
http://www.prochoicemass.org/assets/bin/pdfs/providerchart.pdf. 
58 See id. (In all fairness to Texas, this is not so in Massachusetts either. Many of the 
clinics are grouped around Boston, Adams, or Springfield and Worcester). 
59 This is not to say that it would not still be insulting to imply that people capable of 
bearing children needed a state enforced time out before they could make up their minds 
about a legal medical procedure. In fact, a waiting period may still violate fairness, equal 
protection (the state does not insist that people seeking vasectomies wait any amount of 
time before seeking the procedure, as an example), or other constitutional concerns.  
60 ERROL R. NORWITZ ET AL., OXFORD AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF OBSETRICS AND 
GYNECOLOGY 56-7 (2007). 
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Thirteen states61 require ultrasounds to be performed,62 and some 
have laws encouraging women to have ultrasounds or to view 
ultrasound images even though they are medically unnecessary.63 
In three states, women are required to view the ultrasound.64 And 
in Texas, women seeking abortions in the first trimester 
(approximately 91% of all abortions)65 will likely need a 
transvaginal ultrasound,66 since a less invasive abdominal 
ultrasound will not capture an image of the fetus with the clarity 
required by law.67 All of these laws may cause emotional, mental, 
or physical distress to a recent sexual assault victim, and may 
cause feelings of guilt, anger, depression, or a wide variety of other 
 
61 See Ala. Code § 26-23A-4; Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 36-2156; Fla. Stat. Ann. §390.0111; Ind. 
Code §16-34-2-1.1; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4a09; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §1299.35.2; Miss. Code 
Ann. §41-41-135; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §90-21.82; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §2317.56; Okla. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 63 §1-738.2; Tex. Health and Safety Code Ann. §171.012; Va. Code Ann. §18.2-76; 
Wis. Stat. Ann. §253.10. All of these laws were passed in the last five years, most in the 
last three. 
62 Casey, 505 U.S. at 837.  All of these states should probably refresh their 
understanding of Casey’s undue burden holding, which specifically states that “[a]s with 
any medical procedure, the State may enact regulations to further the health or safety of a 
woman seeking an abortion, but may not impose unnecessary health regulations that 
present a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion.” Also, The American College 
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists have spoken out against forced ultrasound laws as 
unnecessary and harmful to the physician-patient relationship. See generally: The 
Executive Bd. of the Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the Am. Cong. of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists; Statement of Policy: Legislative Interference with Patient 
Care, Medical Decisions, and the Patient-Physician Relationship (May 2013), available at 
http://www.acog.org/-/media/Statements-of-
Policy/Public/2013LegislativeInterference.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20150308T2208565881. Though 
they have not been so ruled yet, and may never be given the Court’s recent attitude toward 
restricting abortion, unnecessary, forced ultrasounds certainly seem like exactly the sort of 
medical procedure Casey specifically ruled impermissible.  
63 Guttmacher Institute, Requirements for Ultrasound, 
https://www.guttmacher.org/state policy/explore/requirements-ultrasound (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2016). Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin all require women to be provided with 
information encouraging them to seek access to ultrasounds. 
64 See id. These states are Kansas, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
65 KAREN PAZOL ET AL., ABORTION SURVEILLENCE—UNITED STATES, CNT. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT, 2009, available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/ss/ss6108.pdf; see Jodi Jacobson, Late Abortions: Facts, 
Stories, and Ways to Get Help, RH REALITY CHECK (Jun. 2, 2009), available at 
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2009/06/02/lateterm-abortions-facts-stories-and-ways-
help/. 
66 See Transvaginal Ultrasound, MEDLINEPLUS, available at 
https://medlineplus.gov/article003779.htm. A transvaginal ultrasound is one where the 
ultrasonic device is inserted into the vagina for a clear picture of the reproductive organs 
and fetus. 
67 DAVOR JURKOVIC ET AL., GYNAECOLOGICAL ULTRASOUND IN CLINICAL PRACTICE: 
ULTRASOUND IMAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF GYNAECOLOGICAL CONDITIONS 143 (2009). 
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reactions in any woman.68 Proponents of these ultrasound laws 
often say that the instances of abortion caused by rape and incest 
are low.69 They are right, with most statistics finding 1% to 2.5% 
of abortions are because of rape and incest.70 Even if one were to 
argue that ultrasounds are no more than a slight inconvenience to 
women who are not the victims of rape or incest,71 Casey reasoned 
that, 
[t]he analysis [of whether an abortion restriction constitutes 
an undue burden] does not end with the one percent of 
women72 upon whom the statute operates; it begins there. 
Legislation is measured for consistency with the Constitution 
by its impact on those whose conduct it affects. . . . The proper 
focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law 
is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is irrelevant.73 
By this logic, it does not matter whether the ultrasound laws are 
harmful to 1% or 100% of women, if they are a burden on any, they 
must be evaluated for the effect they have on that group.  Still, 
ultrasound laws persist.  No challenge to the law has yet made it 
to the Supreme Court, but the number of such abortion restrictions 
continues to increase. 
 
68 For a description of one woman’s distress, see Bonnie Rochman, Requiring 
Ultrasounds Before Abortion: One Mother’s Personal Tragedy, TIME MAGAZINE (Mar. 23, 
2012), available at http://healthland.time.com/2012/03/23/requring-ultrasounds-before-
abortion-one-mothers-personal-tragedy/. Consider also other circumstances that may lead 
to distress upon being forced to view an ultrasound or hear it described, including 
circumstances not exempted by law. For example, women who want children but are in 
situations of domestic violence; women who cannot afford to go through a pregnancy 
without healthcare (or with healthcare that is not comprehensive enough to provide for 
them); or women who have mental or physical conditions that will make birth painful, or 
who cannot be pregnant if they wish to take daily medications. 
69 Laurence B. Finer et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and 
Qualitative Perspectives, GUTTMACHER INST. (Sept. 3, 2005) at 113, available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3711005.pdf; see generally MM Holmes et al., 
Rape-Related Pregnancy: Estimates and Descriptive Characteristics from a National 
Sample of Women, AM. JOURNAL OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY (Aug. 1996), available 
at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/8765248. 
70 See FINER, supra note 69. 
71 And there are any number of reasons why state sanctioned guilt and coercion may 
have a negative effect on women from all walks of life, sexual assault victims or not. 
72 This was in reference to the challenge to the spousal consent portion of the law in 
Casey. Challengers to the law said it would impose an undue burden on women in domestic 
abuse situations, while proponents of the law said this was not an undue burden since only 
approximately 1% of women seeking abortions were in situations of domestic abuse. 
73 Casey, 505 U.S. at 896. 
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Another example of the increasing hostility toward abortion is 
clinic violence.  Only twelve years ago, the Court denied certiorari 
to Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Williamette, Inc. v. American 
Coalition of Life Activists,74 which involved anti-abortion 
protestors and activists who threatened abortion providers by 
printing “wanted” posters with their faces and personal 
information, and distributing them around the providers work and 
home areas.  The posters included a “reward” and encouraged 
violence against the pro-choice doctors, nurses, and staff.75 Stories 
of clinic violence are not uncommon,76 and the Supreme Court 
must have been aware of this when deciding McCullen. Nationally, 
almost one in four clinics reports being the victim of “severe” 
violence, most commonly “bomb threats, death threats, stalking, 
and blockades[.]”77 Clinic violence peaked in the late 1990’s,78 and 
as buffer zone laws began to pass in states and municipalities in 
the late 1990’s and early 2000’s,79 clinic violence declined.80  
 
74 539 U.S. 958 (2003) (cert. denied) (By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court allowed 
a judgment in favor of Planned Parenthood against aggressive and violent harassers to 
remain uncontested). 
75 290 F.3d. 1058, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2002). 
76 See generally David Barstow, An Abortion Battle, Fought to the Death, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jul. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/26/us/26tiller.html?pagewanted=all; Anti-Choice Violence 
and Intimidation, NATIONAL ABORTION RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE (Jan. 1, 2015), available at 
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-anti-choice-violence.pdf; Ilyse 
Hogue, Why the History of Anti-Abortion Violence Cannot Be Ignored, MSNBC (Aug. 9, 
2014), available at http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/women-choice-abortion-violence; 5 Years 
After Dr. George Tiller’s Murder, a Doctor Braves Threats to Continue Abortions in Witchita, 
DEMOCRACY NOW!, http://www.democracynow.org/2014/6/4/5_years_after_dr_george_tiller 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2015); William Booth, Doctor Killed During Abortion Protest, 
WASHINGTON POST (SPECIAL REPORT) (Mar. 3, 1993), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/abortviolence/stories/gunn.htm; 
and for stories specific to Massachusetts see generally Molly Redden, 12 Horror Stories 
Show Why Wednesday’s Big Supreme Court Abortion Case Matters, MOTHERJONES (Jan. 
14, 2014), available at http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/01/abortion-horror-
stories-supreme-court-massachusetts-mccullen-coakley (discussing 12 stories of clinic 
violence, all of which occurred in Massachusetts). 
77 Art Winslow, A Suspenseful Tale About Identity, Reality and Evil, CHICAGO TRIBUNE 
(Mar. 13, 2005), available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-03-
13/entertainment/0503110451_1_nuremberg-files-cloning-reproductive.  
78 Violence Statistics, NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION (2012), 
http://prochoice.org/education-and-advocacy/violence/violence-statistics-and-history/ (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
79 See COL. STAT. REV. ANN. §18-9-122; MASS. GEN. LAW ANN. CH. 266 §120E; MONT. 
CODE ANN. §45-8-110; N.H. REV. STAT §132:38. 
80 Violence Statistics, supra note 78. 
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The holding in McCullen that the Massachusetts buffer zone 
was unconstitutional fits into a larger pattern of increased 
tolerance for abortion restrictions.  The past two decades have seen 
an increase in abortion restrictions aimed at chipping away at the 
foundations of Roe v. Wade.  Between 2001 and 2010, states 
enacted 189 abortion restrictions all together, but between 2011 
and 2013 there have been 205 restrictions passed nationwide.81 In 
2000, Guttmacher Institute classified 13 states as hostile to 
abortion, for having at least four major restrictions on the 
procedure.82 Now, the number has swelled to 27,83 and women in 
more than half of the states in the United States live in a place 
where they will “likely struggle to terminate a pregnancy.”84 In not 
just the United States, but worldwide, more restrictions on 
abortion lead to more maternal deaths, birth-related 
complications, and infant deaths.85 This increase in anti-abortion 
legislation is likely due to emboldened legislators, who notice the 
Court’s less protective stance toward abortion rights.  This 
increased passivity when deciding abortion cases also helps to 
explain how the Court decided McCullen; because the court values 
free speech above the right to privacy86 and abortion, it is more 
willing to sacrifice the right to an abortion even when there is no 
cognizable violation of free speech.  Here, it resulted not only in a 
 
81 Elizabeth Nash et al., Laws Affecting Reproductive Health and Rights: 2013 State 
Policy Review, GUTTMACHER INST. (2014), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/2013/statetrends42013.html. 
82 See id. Most of the restrictions which flagged a state as hostile to abortion were later-
term abortion bans, restrictions on abortion providers, limitations on the provision of 
medication abortion and restrictions on coverage of abortion in private health plans.  
83 Id. 
84 Tara Culp-Ressler, In the Past Three Years, We’ve Enacted More Abortion 
Restrictions than During the Entire Previous Decade, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 2, 2014), 
available at http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/01/02/3112081/abortion-restrictions-
2011-2013/ (discussing: Ian Milhiser & Tara Culp-Ressler, The Greatest Trick the Supreme 
Court Ever Pulled Was Convincing the World Roe v. Wade Still Exists, THINKPROGRESS 
(Dec. 4, 2013), available at http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/12/04/2919111/supreme-
court-roe-wade-exists/). 
85 Lisa B. Haddad & Nawal M. Nour, Unsafe Abortion: Unnecessary Maternal 
Mortality, REVIEWS IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY (vol. 2 Spring 2009), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2709326/; Stephanie Castillo, States With 
More Abortion Restrictions Hurt Women’s Health, Increase Risk for Maternal Death, MED. 
DAILY (Oct. 3, 2014), available at http://www.medicaldaily.com/states-more-abortion-
restrictions-hurt-womens-health-increase-risk-maternal-death-306181. 
86 The court does this even though both free speech and privacy are considered 
fundamental rights. 
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continuation of dangerous conditions for women, but a departure 
from free speech precedent by the Court. 
 
III. McCullen Fits into a Larger Pattern of Increasing 
Abortion Restriction, But Not into Free Speech 
Precedent 
 
McCullen is a departure from precedent in both other buffer 
zone cases and other free speech cases.  McCullen represents 
another hostile precedent toward abortion, which could have 
major repercussions for abortion as a protected fundamental right. 
A. History of Buffer Zones 
The Supreme Court has analyzed the constitutionality of 
abortion clinic buffer zones on several occasions, and has generally 
protected such laws. Buffer zones create areas of restricted access 
to specified locations.  They restrict some or all people from 
entering a certain area, require that people must leave a certain 
area after a certain time, or otherwise serve to filter who is in what 
place and when.  A fixed buffer zone does not move and sets an 
outer limit around a location, which specified people cannot 
enter.87 A floating buffer zone surrounds a moving point of 
interest, which specified people may not approach.88 Buffer zones 
surround areas in everyday public life, from voting booths to 
schools.89 Many go largely uncontested, and when they are, they 
are usually upheld and generally considered to be narrowly 
tailored, even when they are very wide. For example, in Phillips v. 
Borough of Keyport,90 a 300-600 foot buffer zone around an adult 
entertainment store was upheld as constitutional.  In fact, this 
rather large buffer zone was upheld in spite of the Court’s 
 
87 E.g.: Protestors must remain 25 feet from entranceways and driveways to 
reproductive healthcare facilities. 
88 E.g.: Protestors may not approach within 6 feet of anyone entering or exiting a 
reproductive healthcare facility. 
89 For a contemporary and interesting example, see Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 
(2011) (examining the adherence of a group of protesters affiliated with the Westboro 
Baptist Church to a buffer zone of 1,000 feet, which prevented protests around funeral 
homes and cemeteries); see also Mark Sherman, Westboro Baptist Church Wins Supreme 
Court Appeal Over Funeral Protests, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 2, 2011), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/02/westboro-baptist-church-w_n_830209.html. 
90 107 F.3d 164, 172 (1997). 
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acknowledgement that the speech restriction was not content 
neutral,91 and that the lack of content neutrality put even more of 
a burden on the state to tailor the restriction to impose the least 
possible burden.92 The wide buffer zone was deemed necessary to 
public interest and welfare, providing a compelling enough state 
interest that it was seen as reasonably the “least possible” 
burden.93 
 Buffer zones that span hundreds of feet are found in other areas 
of public life as well.  For example, in Massachusetts, the buffer 
zone around polling locations is 150 feet.94 In Louisiana, it is 600 
feet.95 The buffer zones around polling places are generally 
justified to avoid the distribution of material “intended to 
influence”96 the voters on their way into the ballot box. Only one 
case about polling location buffer zones has gone to the Supreme 
Court,97 and only a handful of challenges have been brought to 
court at all.98 In 1992, the Supreme Court heard Burson v. 
Freeman,99 where a Tennessee political party worker sought to 
enjoin statutes prohibiting the distribution of campaign materials 
and solicitation of votes within 100 feet of the polling place.100 The 
Court applied strict scrutiny, and determined the buffer zone was 
valid because it served a compelling state interest to protect a 
voter’s right to cast a vote “in an environment which is free from 
intimidation, harassment, confusion, obstruction, and undue 
influence.”101 
 
91 Id. at 172. The town was specifically targeting the adult entertainment store because 
of the products they sold, but argued a compelling state interest in protecting children and 
public welfare with a 300-foot buffer because it “afforded a constitutionally sufficient 
opportunity for adult expression.”  
92 Id. at 173. 
93 Id. at 172. 
94 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 54 § 65; See Linda Killan, Supreme Court Hypocrisy on Buffer 
Zones?, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 27, 2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2014/06/27/supreme-
hypocrisy-on-buffer-zones/ (accusing the Court of hypocrisy for stripping a 35 foot buffer 
zone from Massachusetts clinics when the Court is protected by a wide buffer zone across 
the Supreme Court plaza). 
95 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 18:1462. 
96 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 54 § 65. 
97 See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). 
98 See Russell v. Lundergan-Grimes, 769 F.3d. 919 (2014); Anderson v. Spear, 356 F.3d. 
651 (2004); PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 902 F. Supp. 2d. 724 (2012). 
99 504 U.S.191 (1992). 
100 Id. at 193-94. 
101 Id. at 194-95. 
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It is such harassment, undue influence, and intimidation that 
buffer zones around abortion clinics are meant to prevent, in 
addition to clinic violence.  The Court had a long history of 
upholding buffer zones around abortion clinics, especially fixed 
buffer zones.  For example, in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 
Inc.,102 the Supreme Court specifically ruled that a 36 foot buffer 
zone around clinic driveways and entrances was constitutional.103 
This fixed buffer zone was found to burden “no more speech than 
necessary to accomplish the governmental interests in protecting 
access to the clinic and facilitating an orderly traffic flow on 
the street.”104 Following Madsen the Court decided Schenck v. Pro-
Choice Network of Western New York,105 which also involved a 
court issued injunction rather than a statute.106 In the opinion, the 
Supreme Court stressed the importance of deference to the district 
court’s finding of a “proper distance to ensure access.”107 The Court 
reasoned that the district court is in a better position to determine 
what kind of buffer zone will properly protect the interests of all 
parties involved.108 The Court in Schenck upheld a 15 foot fixed 
buffer zone around the clinic, while striking down the floating 
buffer zones109 of 15 feet around any person entering or exiting the 
clinic.110 These floating buffer zones were said to burden speech 
more than necessary by enacting a broad prohibition against 
leafleting and other forms of public area speech, and were 
considered too vague for proper enforcement.111 The Court in 
Schenck also cited safety concerns as justifying the buffer zone, 
 
102 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
103 Id. at 770 (protestors blocked access to a Florida clinic, so a court enjoined them 
from interfering with public access to the clinic. The injunction was broadened to a 36-foot 
buffer zone around the entrances and driveways of the clinic, as well as other provisions. 
However, the Supreme Court did reject some aspects of this injunction, such as the 
prohibition of signs and buffer zones for clinic doctors’ private homes). 
104 Id. 
105 Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
106 Id. at 366-67. Protestors routinely blockaded this abortion clinic, so an injunction 
was issued with a 15-foot fixed buffer zone, as well as a 15-foot floating buffer zone.  
107 Id. at 381. 
108 Id. Protecting such interests means balancing the protestors’ First Amendment 
rights with the government interest of ensuring public safety and order. 
109 See id. at 377-78 (describing floating buffer zones as the protestor’s boundaries 
shifting as the object the boundaries protect moves). 
110 Schenck, 519 U.S. at 379. 
111 Id. at 377. 
AHEARN, MACRO (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2017  2:22 PM 
18 JOURNAL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT Vol. 30:1 
holding that preventing threats of violence112 was a sufficient 
governmental interest. The Court also ruled that keeping 
protestors out of close proximity to cars and patients was not too 
broad an interest or aim. 113  
A few years later the court decided a similar case, Hill v. 
Colorado.114 The law being challenged in Hill created a fixed zone 
of 100 feet, inside of which existed a floating buffer zone of 8 
feet.115 Protestors could not enter this floating buffer zone without 
the consent of the patient or staff member entering or exiting the 
clinic.116 In Hill, the Court expressly acknowledged a state 
interest in protecting “those who enter a health care facility from” 
unwilling listeners from speech or conduct that really represented 
“harassment, the nuisance, the persistent importuning, the 
following, the dogging, and the implied threat of physical touching 
that can accompany an unwelcome approach[.]”117 In short, the 
Court acknowledged the need to protect people from harassment 
being disguised as freedom of speech, and allowed states to 
distinguish between the two.  Hill also urged deference to the 
legislature’s judgment about the best way to balance all the 
competing interests of the protestors’ right to free speech with the 
clinic patients and workers’ right to privacy and safety.118 Again, 
the Court believed that the body creating the buffer zone had the 
best information and insight to determine what will work best for 
the clinics involved.  In all three of these cases, the Court protected 
the states’ right to shield clinic patients and staff from harassment 
and violence, deferred to decisions about how to implement buffer 
zones, and upheld buffer zones in varying sizes. 
B. Background on McCullen 
In deciding McCullen, the Court declined to follow this buffer 
zone precedent. In McCullen, a private citizen sued the 
Massachusetts Attorney General to challenge the Massachusetts 
 
112 Id. at 375-76 (mentioning that the threats of violence did at times escalate into 
actual fighting). 
113 Schenck, 519 U.S. at 376. 
114 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 703 (2000). 
115 Id. 
116 Hill, 503 U.S. at 703. 
117 Id. at 724. 
118 Id. at 704. 
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Reproductive Healthcare Facilities Act (MRHFA).  The MRHFA 
was originally passed in 2000.  In 2007 it was amended to include 
a 35-foot wide buffer zone around the entrances and driveways to 
all reproductive healthcare facilities.119 This was done in 
response120 to a wave of anti-choice violence121 around the country 
which had led to11 murders, 17 attempted murders, 550 incidents 
of stalking, plus harassment and other violations of individual 
privacy of pro-choice doctors, patients, staff, and advocates.122 In 
Massachusetts alone, there had been two murders, as well as five 
people injured during an attempted murder.123 The original 
version of the law contained a 15 foot buffer zone with a 6 foot “no 
approach” zone,124 meaning that once inside the 15 foot buffer 
zone, no protestor could approach within 6 feet of a patient or 
provider without permission.125 The revised version expanded the 
buffer zone to disallow protestors entirely, while removing the no 
approach zone.126  
Eleanor McCullen and the other plaintiffs127 were protestors, 
who styled themselves as “sidewalk counselors” and engaged in 
regular attempts to speak to, help, and “counsel” young women 
using the Massachusetts clinics these protestors frequented.128 
The crux of their claim was that because they sought to engage in 
 
119 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 266 §120E1/2. 
120 See generally: Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 1-12, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 
S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168); S. JOURNAL, 185th Cong., at 3 (Mass. Nov. 8, 2007). 
121 Nationwide, “1 in 5 clinics report experiencing severe violence.” See Susie Gillian et 
al., 2014 National Clinic Violence Survey, FEMINIST MAJORITY FOUNDATION (2014), 
available at http://www. http://feminist.org/rrights/pdf/2014ncapsurvey.pdf 
122 Violence and Disruption Statistics, NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION (2014), 
https://prochoice.org/wp-content/uploads/Stats_Table_2014.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
These figures represent the most recent compiled statistics but do not take into account 
clinic violence that occurred in abortion clinics in 2015. In late November of 2015, three 
people were murdered in a Planned Parenthood in Colorado Springs, the first murders 
directly linked to anti-abortion violence since 2009. See Julie Turkewitz and Jack Healy, 3 
Are Dead in Colorado Springs Shootout at Planned Parenthood Center, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
27, 2015).  
123 Christopher B. Daly, Gunman Kills 2, Wounds 5 in Attack on Abortion Clinics, 
WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 31, 1994), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longterm/abortviolence/stories/salvi.htm 
124 Though differently phrased, the “no approach” zone was essentially a floating buffer 
zone. 
125 MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. 266 §2 (2000) (repealed). 
126 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 266 §120E1/2. 
127 The other plaintiffs were Jean Blackburn Zarella, Gregory A. Smith, Eric Cadin, 
and Carmel Ferrell. McCullen v. Coakley, 759 F. Supp. 2d 133, 135 (D. Mass. 2010). 
128 Id. at 208. 
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conversation with the clinic patients, rather than protest, the 
buffer zone was a violation of their free speech rights.129 The court 
declared that the law, as amended, was a violation of Eleanor 
McCullen’s (and other protestors) constitutional rights, as it was 
not narrowly tailored to be a reasonable restriction on free 
speech.130 The Court reasoned that for a law to be narrowly 
tailored, “the government must demonstrate that alternative 
measures that burden substantially less speech would fail to 
achieve the government’s interests[.]”131 
The protestors who brought the suit acknowledged that 
approximately 5% of passersby stopped to engage them, that they 
were not restricted from standing in other areas on the public 
sidewalk which left them visible to the clinic patients and workers, 
and that they were both seen and heard from the clinic while 
outside the buffer zone.132 There was no claim that they need to 
enter the buffer zone in order to be adequately heard, but rather 
that their rights were violated despite their visibility. 
C. Understanding Buffer Zones as a Restriction on Free 
Speech and McCullen as Inconsistent with Buffer Zone 
and Free Speech Precedent 
To understand why McCullen should have conformed to pre-
existing precedent, it is important to understand free speech and 
analyze the case against free speech precedent while comparing it 
to other buffer zone cases.  
The First Amendment provides that the government shall make 
no law “abridging the freedom of speech,”133 meaning that people 
in the United States have wide latitude to express their opinions 
without fear of governmental reprisal.  It has been extended over 
time to include not just speech, but expression generally.134 
 
129 See generally id. 
130 McCullen, 134 S. Ct. at 2521. 
131 Id. at 2524. 
132 McCullen, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 223. 
133 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. 
134 This means essays, dance, silence, music, protest signs, and other forms of 
expression are as protected as traditional speech is. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 790 
(holding that music, although speech, was subject to restriction); Clark v. Community for 
Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding that protests were subject to 
restriction even though they were a protected form of speech). 
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Freedom of speech is one of the most important rights granted to 
United States citizens, as evidenced by its inclusion in the very 
First Amendment in the Bill of Rights.135 
Contrary to what many laypeople believe, freedom of speech is 
not an unrestricted right in the United States.  Although perhaps 
one of our most lauded and protected fundamental rights, there is 
a history almost as old as the country itself of restricting speech 
that is violent or which in some ways runs afoul of public policy 
considerations.  Perhaps the oldest case to recognize that the Bill 
of Rights is not without restrictions is Robertson v. Baldwin.136 
The 1897 case involved a man arrested for refusing to complete a 
seaman’s contract.137 Although the Court held that the Thirteenth 
Amendment, which abolished slavery and servitude, was not 
meant to invalidate laws against desertion, it provided that the 
Bill of Rights, generally, was simply meant to embody certain 
guarantees and immunities “which had, from time immemorial, 
been subject to certain well-recognized exceptions[.]”138 The Court 
simply found that anti-desertion laws were not such an exception.  
Later, two 1919 cases relied on that language when looking 
specifically at restrictions on free speech, citing the case when 
discussing exceptions to First Amendment freedoms.  Frohwerk v. 
United States139 ruled that the First Amendment as written 
“cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give 
immunity for every possible use of language.”140 Seven days 
previously, Schenck v. United States141 had stated that when 
 
135 U.S. CONST. AMEND. I. 
136 165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
137 Id. Robertson contracted to be a seaman aboard a ship bound for Valparaiso, Chile. 
He became dissatisfied with his employment and disembarked while the ship was in 
Astoria, Oregon, and refused to continue the voyage. He was then arrested and held before 
being returned to the ship against his will. When he continued to refuse to complete his 
work, he was charged. The man argued that the statute allowing him to be charged with 
desertion constituted a violation of his Thirteenth Amendment rights. The Thirteenth 
Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary servitude. 
138 Id. at 281. 
139 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919). In this case, Jason Frohwerk was charged with conspiracy 
to violate the Espionage Act. He was charged with preparing to circulate a paper 
encouraging people to disloyalty and mutiny among military and naval forces. Frohwerk 
contended that the law prohibiting such circulation was a violation of his right to free 
speech.  
140 Id. 
141 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 48–49, 52 (1919). This case is also one where 
the defendants were originally charged with violations of the Espionage Act. They were also 
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determining when states could restrict a person’s free speech, the 
Court considers “whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and 
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils 
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity 
and degree.”142 This was the first articulation of a rule that the 
Supreme Court would refine over the course of the 20th century to 
determine if a restriction on free speech was constitutional.  
This rule for free speech restrictions is best summarized in Ward 
v. Rock Against Racism, which reasoned that,  
even in a public forum the government may impose 
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of 
protected speech, provided the restrictions “are justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, 
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest, and that they leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the 
information.”143 
In 1989, Ward v. Rock Against Racism evaluated a noise buffer, 
which required a concert to keep its volume within certain limits 
so that the general community would not hear it.144 In the 
decision, the Court held that when free speech was being regulated 
according to time, place, or manner, the restriction “need not be 
the least restrictive or least intrusive means” of regulating that 
speech, although it could not be substantially burdensome.145 This 
important decision ruled that if a law is content neutral and based 
on a compelling state interest, and the restriction is not 
“substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s 
interest,”146 it cannot be defeated simply because a less restrictive 
option is available. 
 
said to have circulated printed material, which caused and intended to cause mutiny in 
military and naval forces. 
142 Id. 
143 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.,781, 791 (quoting Clark v. Comm. for 
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). For other cases with regulation test 
language, see Virginia State Bd. Of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983); U.S. v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983). 
144 Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 781. 
145 Id. at 798. 
146 Id. at 799.  
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The Court agreed that the law being contested in McCullen was 
content neutral, as it does not “draw content-based distinctions on 
its face.”147 The Court ruled that “a facially neutral law does not 
become content based simply because it may disproportionately 
effect speech on certain topics,”148 and that incidental effect is not 
enough if the regulation serves a purpose unrelated to the content 
of the expression involved.149 Though the law is concededly 
content neutral, the Court holds that the law is not narrowly 
tailored enough.150 However, this runs contrary to the Court’s 
previous precedent on what narrow tailoring means.  An 
examination of the meaning of narrow tailoring and a comparison 
to other buffer zone cases highlights the inconsistency of this 
decision to other Supreme Court precedent. 
In order for a speech restriction to be narrowly tailored, it must 
not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further 
the government’s legitimate interests.”151 Although it need not be 
the least restrictive of all possible options, the regulation must not 
“regulate speech in such a manner that a substantial portion of 
the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.”152  
The regulation in McCullen seems to have been developed with 
Madsen153 in mind, using similar distances to measure the buffer 
zone and measuring the zones specifically around the entrances 
and driveways.  It also avoided the problematic aspects of the 
regulation in Madsen, such as sign restrictions and buffer zones 
for surrounding property.  The choice of a 35-foot buffer zone 
around driveways and entrances was not very likely an accident, 
and was probably the result of an effort to conform to the Supreme 
Court precedent in Madsen and other cases.  The District Court in 
McCullen found that the 35-foot buffer zone was adequate to 
ensure the patients and prospective patients had access to the 
 
147 McCullen 134 S. Ct., at 2531. 
148 Id. 
149 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
150 McCullen, 134 S. Ct at 2523. 
151 Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. 
152 Id. at 798-99 (“Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied ‘so long as 
the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less 
effectively absent the regulation.’” (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 
(1985))). 
153 512 U.S. 753 (1994). Madsen ruled that a similarly sized fixed buffer zone (of 36-
feet) was constitutional. 
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clinic, while leaving open “adequate alternative means of 
communication” for the protestors.154 Although the first iteration 
of the Massachusetts Reproductive Healthcare Facilities Act may 
have been constitutional under Hill, floating buffer zones are a 
delicate and more controversial subject.  Their replacement in 
2007 with the 35-foot fixed buffer zone should have made the 
MRHFA less controversial as fixed buffer zones are more often 
upheld. It also allows protestors greater freedom of expression 
than the original Act.  For many years, courts have determined 
that buffer zones similar to the one in the MRHFA are narrowly 
tailored to achieve a long-conceded governmental interest in 
protecting patient privacy and clinic safety,155 and the decision in 
McCullen flies in the face of years of precedent about what narrow 
tailoring of abortion specific speech should look like.  It also 
disregards a precedent of deference to the Legislature and to the 
District Courts when deciding what is an appropriate amount of 
space to balance the interests of the protestors, patients, and 
government. 
In addition to narrow tailoring, another important consideration 
of free speech restriction is whether the restriction “leave[s] open 
ample alternative channels of communication.”156 If speech is 
restricted but a person has other channels and means to 
disseminate expression, the restriction is considered more 
narrowly tailored and less burdensome.157 The restriction 
challenged in McCullen leaves more than ample channels for the 
protestors to communicate their feelings about abortion.  From 35-
feet away, signs would be clearly visible. Any patients158 walking 
to the clinic could be approached from more than 35-feet away, and 
any patients driving by would see signs clearly.  There were no 
noise restrictions in the statute, and handing out leaflets outside 
the buffer zone perimeter was permitted.  As the District Court 
noted in its opinion, “it is apparent that Plaintiffs are able to 
 
154 McCullen, 844 F. Supp. 2d 206, 224 (2012). 
155 As evidenced by Madsen, Schenck, and Hill. The rulings in these cases all discussed 
this important interest and found buffer zones to be narrowly tailored, even ones larger 
than the one challenged in McCullen. Madsen, 512 U.S. at 753; Schenck v. Pro Choice 
Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 357 (1997); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 703 (2000). 
156 Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; see Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
157 Ward, 491 U.S. 802; Clark, 468 U.S. 293. 
158 Or any passerby at all, in fact. 
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convey their pro-life message to people entering the clinic and 
people passing by.”159 The court further noted that any patients 
interested in the message being broadcast by the plaintiffs were 
free and able to approach them, and that at one location 
approximately 5% of the patients and passersby did engage with 
the plaintiff.160 Being restricted from standing directly next to the 
clinic’s two driveways “does not mean that adequate alternative 
means of communication do not exist,” and as the District Court 
noted, “Plaintiffs may engage in any form of communicative 
activity they desire anywhere else on the public sidewalk.”161 The 
narrow tailoring of the MRHFA is even more clearly demonstrated 
by the ease with which the plaintiffs were able to continue 
spreading their message, being visible and audible at all times. 
D. McCullen as an Endorsement of Harassment as a Valid 
Exercise of Speech 
The Supreme Court is not balancing the interests of the 
government and protestors; it is sacrificing the safety, health, and 
privacy of people seeking abortions to an overextension of freedom 
of speech.  One of the most important elements of a free and 
democratic government is that it protects the fundamental rights 
of its people from those who wish to infringe upon them.  Though 
the protestors and “sidewalk counselors” at abortion clinics claim 
to only want to provide information to the willing listener, 
evidence (anecdotes162 as well as statistics on violence and 
 
159 McCullen, 844 F. Supp. 2d at 224. 
160 Id. at 223. 
161 Id. at 224. 
162 For such anecdotes, see REDDEN, supra note 76, (this article was written in response 
to McCullen v. Coakley, to highlight violence clinics often face). See also Aaron Gouveia, My 
Wife’s Abortion v. Your Free Speech, TIME MAGAZINE (Jun. 26, 2014), available at 
http://time.com/2928275/supreme-court-abortion-free-speech/ (a piece written in response 
to McCullen, by a man whose YouTube video of himself confronting protestors harassing 
his wife went viral.); Abortion Doctor: AL Protestors “More Harassing”, WSFA12 NEWS (May 
22, 2014), available at http://www.wsfa.com/story/25590440/abortion-doctor-al-protesters-
more-harassing (a news piece profiling a doctor’s perspective on clinic harassment); 
Samantha Lachman, Undercover Audio Reveals How Anti-Abortion Activists Pursue 
Patients, Providers, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 2014), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/12/abortion-protesters-_n_5672077.html (an 
article about an anti-abortion protest “training video” in which protestors were encouraged 
to track patient license plates, “line” sidewalks to maximize intimidation, and look up 
district records to follow abortion providers throughout the state). 
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harassment)163 proves otherwise.  To quote an article on the 
McCullen decision: “if there’s only one participant, is it even a 
conversation?”164 The goal of these sidewalk counselors is not to 
merely converse, not to merely express themselves.  It is to shame 
and harass women who have made a choice the protestors disagree 
with.  If the goal were open-ended, civil conversation with 
consenting individuals, the protestors would have no need to avail 
themselves of the limited buffer zone area, since from 35-feet away 
they can still be seen and heard.  If consensual conversation were 
their goal, willing participants would come to them, as one 
plaintiff in McCullen admitted happened about 5% of the time.165 
The protestors were free to make themselves known and available 
to patients,166 though without the ability to approach them. 
Protestors also had to remain a respectful distance if the patients 
were not interested in their dialogue.167  
The Supreme Court has sanctioned harassment in free speech 
clothing, and by all accounts the state of Massachusetts introduced 
evidence enough to make the Court aware of this.  The opinion 
failed to acknowledge that opposition to abortion has led to 8 
murders, 17 attempted murders, 550 incidents of stalking, plus 
harassment and other violations of individual privacy of pro-choice 
doctors, patients, staff, and advocates.168 Indeed, the Court makes 
 
163 See generally: Violence Statistics supra note 77; GILLIAN, supra note 121. 
164 Emily Jane Goodman, Supreme Court Decision on Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones 
Opens the Door to Further Challenges, THE NATION (Jul. 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.thenation.com/article/180474/supreme-court-decision-abortion-clinic-buffer-
zones-opens-door-further-challenges. 
165 McCullen, 844 F.2d at 223. 
166 At no time in McCullen did any of the plaintiffs contest the fact that they could be 
easily seen, heard, and noticed from outside the buffer zone at any of the clinics they 
frequented. 
167 Indeed, for a group styling themselves as counselors, they certainly are not following 
traditional counseling methods. It is a rare occasion indeed that a psychologist takes to the 
streets, demanding to diagnose passersby. If they truly were interested in counseling 
women who wanted more information about abortion alternatives, they should be more 
content to make themselves known and allow such women to come speak to them. 
168 The Court failed to acknowledge this even though it was the focus of the 
respondent’s argument in favor of the law. See generally Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondents at 12, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168), 
2013 WL 6157111, *12; Brief of Amici Curiae, Am. Coll. of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Am. 
Med. Ass’n, and Mass. Med. Soc’y for Respondents at 11-2, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 
2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168), 2013 WL 6213247, *12-13; Brief of Amici Curiae, Civil Rights 
Orgs. For Respondents at *26, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 11-1268), 
2013 WL 6228466, *1; Brief of Amici Curiae, Law Professors in Support of Respondent at 1, 
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 U.S. 2518 (2014)(No. 11-1268), 2013 WL 6235567, *1; Brief of 
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only two mentions of the violence faced by abortion clinics,169 
despite its paramount importance to the case.  The Court also 
made little to no mention of the evidence that buffer zones do 
decrease violence in, and increase access to, reproductive 
healthcare clinics, keeping protestors at a safe distance to stop the 
escalation of already tense interactions.170 
Clinics in Massachusetts fear the decision has already 
pressured people to stay home. In the week following the decision, 
a Planned Parenthood in the state reported more no-shows than 
usual.171 Protestors were observed following patients down the 
street and to the doors of the clinic, even as most patients showed 
a desire to be left alone by ignoring them. One young woman 
entering the clinic said she “felt uncomfortable,” and described the 
protestors’ behavior as making her “feel harassed[.]”172 Coakley, 
the Massachusetts Attorney General who unsuccessfully defended 
the buffer zone regulation, stated that since the buffer zone was 
struck down, many women “have had their access denied as a 
practical matter”173 because they have been afraid to access the 
clinic.  
Given the rise of anti-abortion violence that occurred during the 
1990’s, a law like the MRHFA provided vital protection to 
individuals who wished to avail themselves of abortion services.174 
 
Amici Curiae, Nat’l Abortion Fed’n & 31 Other Orgs. at 5-21, McCullen v. Coakley, 134 U.S. 
2518 (11-1268), 2013 WL 6504289, *1; see also Violence Statistics supra note 78.  
169 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 U.S. 2518, 2523, 2532 (2014). 
170 Most acts of violence against clinics happen within feet of clinic doors, and many 
are the result of the escalation of protestors. Many protestors were known for protesting 
and harassing clinics in their area well before they committed acts of violence. See generally 
Brief of Nat’l Abortion Fed’n & 31 Other Orgs. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518 (2014) (No. 12-1168), 2013 WL 6504289, *18. 
171 Laura Bassett, Abortion Clinic Buffer Zones Crumble Around the Country, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Jul. 9, 2014), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/09/abortion-clinic-buffer-zo_n_5571516.html; 
Alana Semuels, Abortion Buffer Zone Laws Begin Falling Apart After Supreme Court 
Ruling, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 7, 2014), available at  
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-buffer-zone-laws-struck-down-
20140707-story.html. 
172 Alana Semuels, Abortion Buffer Zone Laws Begin Falling Apart After Supreme 
Court Ruling, L.A. TIMES (Jul. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-buffer-zone-laws-struck-down-
20140707-story.html. 
173 Id. 
174 It also protects those who provide abortion services and the countless other 
individuals of varying genders and ages who rely on clinics like Planned Parenthood for 
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Not only did abortion clinic violence decrease in the years when 
buffer zones began to be introduced, but buffer zones help to 
establish who has legitimate business inside clinics, and helps to 
separate those individuals from ones who may wish to harass or 
possibly harm them.  The consequences of not protecting these 
people from threats of violence are clear: protestors are 
emboldened to harass and in extreme cases attack; patients 
become uncomfortable and frightened; and for many, access to 
abortion becomes difficult or unthinkable as a practical matter. 
In the larger context of abortion hostility, this ruling can only 
make things worse and continue to embolden protestors to use 
extreme methods and harassment. It continues to signal the 
Court’s reluctance to properly and vigorously defend the 
fundamental right to abortion, which emboldens legislators to 
infringe further on the already weakening right.  Not only does 
this strip women in Massachusetts (and possibly other states with 
similar laws) of protections against intimidation, harassment, and 
violence, but it adds to Supreme Court cases that chip away at the 
foundations protecting abortion rights.  This case throws other 
similar buffer zones in other states into question, and allows 
legislators to more easily reject or remove buffer zone protections 
on the federal and state level.  This changing attitude toward 
buffer zones, previously so solidly protected by the Court, may also 
contribute to increased harassment and violence against 
protestors, as was seen in the 1990’s before such buffer zones 
began to pass. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Every day, people from all backgrounds and lifestyles find out 
that they or a loved one are pregnant.  For many this is a time of 
celebration and joy, but for many others it is terrifying. Whether 
they are in situations of abuse, or in poverty, or have a mental 
health condition making it impossible to care for a child, or were 
raped, or simply never want to be parents, the idea of birthing and 
raising a child is personal, and some circumstances make it the 
wrong choice for many Americans.  In a post-Roe world, most 
 
other services, such as STD testing, cancer screenings and mammography, birth control, 
family and interpersonal violence resources, and prenatal care.  
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Americans rest easy with the thought that abortion is a legal and 
protected right. Many do not see the regulations and attitudes that 
creep slowly toward criminalizing abortion once more.175 
These changes to the abortion jurisprudence are allowed under 
many guises.  From freedom of speech, to the “right to life” of the 
fetus, to the many unnecessary regulations passed and allowed 
because they are said to serve the state interest in protecting the 
health of the mother,176 there is no shortage of interests states 
have come up with to oppose and restrict abortion.  But the one 
interest that seems to be consistently forgotten is the interests of 
the pregnant person.  The fundamental right of a person to seek 
an abortion is rarely discussed anymore, and though it seems to 
be taken for granted, a close look at the state of abortion regulation 
in America shows it is anything but secure.  
 
175 Although abortion is still legal, women across the country have found themselves 
jailed for abortions or even miscarriages based on draconian abortion regulation laws. See 
Emily Bazelon, A Mother In Jail for Helping Her Daughter Have an Abortion, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 22, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/magazine/a-mother-in-
jail-for-helping-her-daughter-have-an-abortion.html (a woman secured abortion pills for 
her daughter without realizing it was against Pennsylvania state law, and is now in jail); 
Kate Sheppard, Mississippi Could Soon Jail Women for Stillbirths, Miscarriages, 
MOTHERJONES (May 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/buckhalter-mississippi-stillbirth-
manslaughter (a woman jailed under suspicion that she ingested methamphetamines, 
killing her unborn fetus); Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Pregnant, and No Civil Rights, 
N.Y. TIMES OP-ED (Nov. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/08/opinion/pregnant-and-no-civil-rights.html (various 
instances of women jailed for abortions and miscarriages); Jason Foster, Woman Faces 
Charges of Killing Unborn Child During August Suicide Attempt, THE HERALD (Feb. 21, 
2009), available at http://www.heraldonline.com/2009/02/21/1152282/woman-faces-charge-
of-killing.html (a South Carolina woman jailed after a suicide attempt caused the death of 
her unborn fetus); JEANNE FLAVIN, OUR BODIES, OUR CRIMES: THE POLICING OF WOMEN’S 
REPRODUCTION IN AMERICA, NYU PRESS 84 (2009), available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qffnc.7 (referring to a Louisiana woman who went to jail 
on second degree murder charges for over a year before an autopsy proved she had had a 
miscarriage). 
176 Ultrasounds are an excellent example of this, as are requirements that abortion 
providers have admitting privileges at local hospitals. Even though abortion is a thoroughly 
safe procedure with a low risk of complications and both restrictions are considered 
unnecessary by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, many states have 
passed or considered such restrictions. Some states even regulate things like corridor width 
in an attempt to covertly shut down clinics.  See generally State Policies in Brief: Targeted 
Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2015), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_TRAP.pdf; Jim Forsyth, Anti-Abortion 
Group to Move into Shuttered Texas Clinic, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2014), available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/10/us-usa-texas-abortion-
idUSKCN0IU2C920141110. 
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The Supreme Court will have to revisit its decision in McCullen 
v. Coakley, and unless it wishes to take this country in a new and 
unprecedented direction,177 it will have to overturn the decision.  
Free speech does not trounce other personal and fundamental 
rights, and McCullen has continued a dangerous trend that has 
put one such fundamental right gravely at risk. 
 
 
177 Or rather, unless they want to drag us kicking and screaming back in the direction 
we came from. 
